Corporate Law\u27s Race to Nowhere in Particular by Bratton, William Wilson
University of Miami Law School 
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository 
Articles Faculty and Deans 
1994 
Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular 
William Wilson Bratton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
CORPORATE LAW'S RACE
TO NOWHERE IN PARTICULARt
Competition among the American states for corporate charters is
discussed from two divergent points of view - a 'race to the bottom'
versus a 'race to the top.' Under the former view, most prominently
articulated by William L. Cary,' the states compete to provide managers
with special benefits. The competition causes state law to adhere less
and less strongly to the norm of shareholder wealth maximization, and
a federal corporate law regime should be imposed to remedy the prob-
lem. Under the latter view, most prominently articulated by Ralph
Winter,2 market controls assure that efficient governance structures
result as the states respond to managers' demands. This obviates any
need for federal intervention.'
The two views, thus juxtaposed, make for a clear statement of the
issues raised by state charter competition. But, unfortunately, the
oppositional formulation no longer describes the substance of the de-
bate. It has been a number of years since either view - 'race to the top'
or 'race to the bottom' - has had any vocal adherents. Discussion of
state charter competition now occupies a middle ground. On the
middle ground, many desirable results of state competition are recog-
nized. But negative effects on shareholder value also are identified,
especially in respect of regulation of takeovers.'
* Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
t A review of The Genius of American Corporate Law by Roberta Romano (Washington:
The AEI Press 1993) pp. xvii, 161, US$24.75.
My thanks to David Carlston, Larry Cunningham,Joe McCahery, and Larry Mitchell
for their comments on drafts of this essay, and toJoseJara for research assistance.
1 W. Cary 'Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware' (1974) 83 Yale
LJ663.
2 R. Winter 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation'
(1977) 6J Leg. Stud. 251.
3 For a useful summary of this discussion, see R. Daniels 'Should Provinces Compete?
The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market' (1991) 36 McGill LJ130, 170-9.
4 See, e.g., R. Winter 'The Race for the Top Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg'
(1989) 89 Colum. LR 1526, 1528 (expressing more confidence in the view that Cary
was wrong than that state competition results in a race to the top); F. Easterbrook
and D. Fischel The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press 1991) 222 (race to the top stands as refuted, but the proposition
that competition creates a 'powerful tendency' to enact shareholder beneficial laws
remains vital); M. Eisenberg 'The Structure of Corporation Law' (1989) 89 Colum.
LR 1461, 1509 (position between Winter's and Cary's but closer to Cary's).
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Professor Roberta Romano first staked out the middle ground in an
article published in 1985.' That article and her subsequent work on the
subject make hers the leading voice on corporate regulatory competi-
tion in the United States. Two elements distinguish Romano's contribu-
tion. First, her model of incorporation as product competition driven
by transaction-cost concerns has the capacity to simplify the description
of the process of corporate law creation even as it explains most of the
institutional details. Second, she observes the distinction between fact
and value more scrupulously than any other corporate law academic.
Her projects search in the first instance for answers to fact questions:
Does reincorporation in Delaware in fact decrease shareholder value?6
Why do legislatures enact anti-takeover statutes?7 She does the hard,
empirical work required to propose answers. Her enterprise reproaches
those of us who tend to remain content to ruminate in a world of
descriptive and normative theory, testing propositions in the limited
and uncertain framework of personal experience and confirming them
with anecdotal evidence from periodicals. In a discourse where refer-
ence to the empirical work of others is routine, Romano does her own.
Romano has restated her work on corporate regulatory competition
in a book, The Genius of American Corporate Law.' It is a pleasure to
report that the book is not a collection of chapters that separately
condense each of her many articles. Instead, it sets out her principal
points in a new and concise essay, and adds some new material. It is
welcome for these reasons alone.
The book also is timely. Romano builds on three positions. Two of
these are descriptive - an explanation of reincorporation in terms of
transaction costs, and an explanation of Delaware's position as the
5 R. Romano 'Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle' (1985) 1 J
of Law, Econ. & Org. 225.
6 Romano's event study of the stock prices of corporations moving to Delaware
transformed the normative direction taken by the state competition discussion. See
supra note 5.
7 R. Romano 'The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes' (1987) 73 Va LR 111.
8 Supra note t.
9 These include the articles cited supra notes 5 and 7; 'A Guide to Takeovers:
Theory, Evidence and Regulation' (1992) 9 YaleJ Reg. 119; 'State Competition for
Close Corporation Charters: A Commentary' (1992) 70 Wash. U. LQ 409; 'The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation' (1991) 7J of Law, Econ. & Org.
55; 'Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis' (1990) 39
Emory LJ 1155; 'Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory
Corporate Laws' (1989) 89 Colum. LR 1599; 'The Future of Hostile Takeovers:
Legislation and Public Opinion' (1988) 57 U. Cin. LR 457; 'The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law' (1987) 8 Cardozo LR 709.
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preferred state of incorporation of large American firms in terms of
relational contracting. The third position is normative - a firm opposi-
tion to any form of federal intervention, derived from a view of the
benefits and detriments of competition close to that of Winter on the
range of opinion between Winter's and Cary's.1° Each of these positions
has been controverted, and the controversy has been intensifying.
The controversy proceeds on the middle ground, and the middle
ground leaves open room for contrasting descriptions of the competi"
tive system and different normative conclusions respecting some of its
consequences." Many on the middle ground remain closer to Cary than
to Winter, and stand ready to isolate some state law provisions for federal
pre-emption. The flow of reform suggestions has quickened lately, partly
as a response to widespread enactment of anti-takeover legislation by the
states in the 1980s," and partly as a response to the trend towards active
participation in corporate decision-making by institutional investors."3
Romano takes the opportunity to confront these differing views in her
book. The book, in turn, invites a review of the state of the debate at
this unstable moment in American corporate politics.
This commentary undertakes such a review. It takes the position that
Romano's product competition model, while sound in most respects,
needs to be unpacked to allow us to confront barriers to shareholder
input in corporate contracting processes. The exercise of unpacking
shows that the product competition analogy, taken alone, does not fully
describe the creation of corporate law. A pattern of political mediation
partially corrects the system in response to the shareholders' voice
problem and shares a place in the description. Nor does the product
competition analogy, taken alone, provide a basis for projecting a
satisfactory solution to the voice problem itself.
Part I considers Romano's explanations of state competition and
Delaware's position in the light of her responses to those who supple-
10 Romano 'State Competition Debate' supra note 9, 753.
11 Ibid. 753.
12 See L. Bebchuk 'Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law' (1992) 105 Harv. LR 1435; D. Charny 'Competition
among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective
on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities' (1991) 32 Harv. Int. LJ
423; J. Seligman 'The New Corporate Law (1993) 59 Brooklyn LR 1; J. Seligman
'The Case for Minimum Corporate Law Standards' (1990) 49 Maryland LR 947.
13 See R. Karmel 'Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?' (1991) 57 Brooklyn LR
55. Congressman Markey recently introduced federal legislation that would
increase shareholder power respecting director nominations by mandating
inclusion of shareholder nominees on the issuer's proxy ballot. See 25 BNA Secs.
Reg. &L. Rep. (29 October 1993) 1464.
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ment or modify her model. Here her principal interlocutors are
Bernard Black, 4John Coffee,"5 Melvin Eisenberg, 6 andJonathan Macey
and Geoffrey Miller. 7 Drawing on Coffee and Eisenberg, the discussion
suggests that reference must be made to the threat of federal interven-
tion as we explain Delaware's status and ongoing behaviour. Part II
considers the case for federal intervention. Here Romano's principal
interlocutors are Lucian Bebchuk s and David Charny.' 9 The discussion
questions Romano's view that the regulatory responsiveness attending
jurisdictional competition results in the best available mix of corporate
law rules. It suggests that Romano - inadvertently - is a leading voice
for federal intervention.
I Charter competition as cost economy and relational contract
A. THE MODEL.
1. Charter competition in the United States
Romano's model assumes that state corporation codes may be viewed
as products consumed by corporations"° (p. 6). In her story, firms
operate in dynamic conditions, and competition for their legal business
forces the states to adapt the law to these changing circumstances. State
lawmaking emerges as a trial-and-error process suited to the accurate
identification of optimal corporate arrangements. Delaware, the lead-
ing state," excels in this market (p. 9).
14 B. Black 'Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis' (1990) 84
Nw. U. LR 542.
15 J. Coffee 'The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New
Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards' (1987) 8 Card ozo LR 759.
16 Eisenberg, supra note 4.
17 J. Macey and G. Miller 'Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law' (1987) 65 Texas LR 469.
18 Bebchuk, supra note 12.
19 Charny, supra note 12.
20 On the question as to the existence of charter competition, Romano does not have
to make an assumption. She has support in her own empirical work (p. 16). Her
study of the spread of innovation in corporations codes found that innovations
spread rapidly in a pattern resembling the S-shaped diffusion curve of technologi-
cal innovations. Supra note 5, 225. Her study of state responsiveness, ibid. 237-8,
found that states that are more responsive gain more and lose fewer incorporations,
and that state responsiveness is significantly positively correlated to the proportion
of state revenues derived from franchise taxes. Ibid.
21 Delaware is home to one-half of the largest American corporations, and the new
domicile of 80 per cent of reincorporating firms. Supra note 5, 244.
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The state lawmaking process, in Romano's view, benefits the share-
holders on the whole. She admits that state competition would be un-
desirable if it resulted in codes that so favoured management prefer-
ences as to impair shareholder interests. But she does not find that
characterization to be accurate, citing her famous empirical rebuttal of
Cary's 'race to the bottom' position. Event studies by her (and others)
consistently show that reincorporating firms do not experience stock
price declines (pp. 16-18).
In Romano's account, reincorporating firms are the marginal
consumers in the charter market. They seek a legal regime that reduces
their costs, and a guaranty that the new state of domicile will maintain
the desirability of its code (p. 32). She backs the cost-reduction asser-
tion with her study of public corporation domicile changes between
1960 and 1982. The study shows that corporations tend to change
domiciles in advance of either a public offering, an acquisitions pro-
gram, or the promulgation of anti-takeover measures 22 (p. 33). They
incur substantial costs in so doing, including the one-time costs of the
move, the possibility of appraisal claims, and, in the case of corpora-
tions moving to Delaware, the present negative value of an additional
layer of high franchise taxes (pp. 34-5). The benefits mostly stem from
the threat of litigation - all three of the identified transactional occa-
sions for changes of domicile entail litigation risks. The reincorporating
firms look to the target state for a predictable legal regime. Delaware
provides this with its comprehensive case law, well-specified indemni-
fication rules, and expert judiciary (pp. 33-4, 39 n20).
Romano's account of Delaware's leading position rests on one
further point. The reincorporating firm and the target jurisdiction
enter into a relational contract that entails a risk of opportunistic
breach. Even as the firm invests to gain access to the target's favourable
legal regime, the target remains free to change its politics and trans-
form itself into an unresponsive jurisdiction.2" The competitive jurisdic-
tion has to reduce this possibility by offering a credible commitment
(pp. 36-7). Delaware's commitment stems from its dependence on
franchise tax revenues.24 These revenues are an 'intangible asset' 2 that
22 Ibid.
23 New Jersey did this early in the twentieth century, precipitating a mass movement
of corporations across the river to Delaware.
24 These amounted to 17.7 per cent of Delaware's total tax revenues in 1990 (p. 10).
25 Romano offers some new empirical work to bolster this point. She surveys the costs
and franchise tax returns of Delaware's chartering business between 1960 and 1990
(pp. 7-8), and sets out franchise revenue as a proportion of tax collections for the
fifty states, 1960-1990 (pp. 10-11).
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emerges from the combination of a large number of incorporations
and a small population. Delaware also invests in real assets specific to its
incorporation business - its case law and judicial and administrative
expertise. These, together with Delaware's code, constitute a reputa-
tional capital. Delaware has devised legal devices to protect this capital
against political disruption. These include its direction of corporate
matters to a specialized chancery court, its practice of appointing
rather than electing its judges and limiting them to twelve-year terms,
and its requirement of two-thirds majorities of both houses of its
legislature for the approval of corporation code amendments (pp.
38-42). The storehouse of capital, thus well guarded, bolsters the
state's market position in two ways. First, it fosters reciprocal dependen-
cies between Delaware and its customers. The lawyers who recommend
reincorporation to client corporations invest in Delaware expertise, and
thus have incentives to recommend it as a destination. Their clients
need to economize on legal costs, and thus tend to stay in place (pp.
43-4). Second, other states cannot credibly precommit to offer superi-
or service, and thus are deterred from incurring the necessary start-up
costs. A first-mover advantage in Delaware results26 (pp. 40-1, 44).
2. Canada and Europe compared
Romano complements her discussion of charter competition in the
United States with a comparison of corporate law systems in Canada
26 Romano reviews the competing explanations of R. Posner and K. Scott Economics of
Corporation Law and Securities Regulation (Boston: Little Brown 1980) and B.
Baysinger and H. Butler 'The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm'
(1985) 28]. of Law &Econ. 179. Posner and Scott suggested that large firms go to
Delaware. Romano notes in response that only 50 per cent of the large firms go to
Delaware This creates a puzzle for solution, given the assumption that legal
regimes are costly in differing degrees and in the presence of competition. Romano
solves the puzzle with her transactional explanation of reincorporation motivations
- the cost picture only indicates a move to Delaware when the firm envisages one
of the described transactions.
Baysinger and Butler distinguished Delaware and non-Delaware firms based on
concentration of ownership. In their study, firms with holders of large blocks of
stock tend towards strict states because the large holders lack easy exit and depend
more on legal monitoring mechanisms. Romano dislikes this product-differentia-
tion story because she is not convinced of the existence of meaningfully strict
regimes; competition causes state codes to converge in their basic sets of provisions.
She accounts for Baysinger and Butler's empirical results by noting that con-
centrated ownership diminishes the need to migrate to Delaware in the first
instance. Since the blockholders exercise control, the legal regime matters little,
unless new activities are to be undertaken (pp. 45-7).
Romano has the better of this discussion.
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and Western Europe. This new material takes her model to the task of
explaining the absence of American-style jurisdictional competition
elsewhere.
The Canadian discussion centres on leading articles by Ronald
Daniels andJeffrey MacIntosh. Daniels explained the diffusion among
the provinces of the reform provisions of the Canada Business Corpora-
tions Act after its 1975 enactment as a form of charter competition."
MacIntosh has countered that the federal innovations should be
treated either as a random event or a function of bureaucratic prefer-
ences. Romano, bringing components of her American model to bear,
tends towards MacIntosh's view. She questions whether the Canadian
federal government has significant incentives to compete for charters.
Unlike Delaware, it does not look to franchise taxes to make up a sig-
nificant proportion of total revenues' (pp. 120-1). In accounting for
the absence of vigorous provincial charter competition, she joins with
both Daniels and Macintosh in citing authority-sharing arrangements
among the provinces and between the provinces and the federal gov-
ernment, in particular the corporate governance authority of provincial
securities administrators and the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisdic-
tional authority over the provinces (pp. 122-3). She adds a reference to
concentration of ownership of larger Canadian firms," noting that
27 Daniels, supra note 3; Jeffrey MacIntosh 'The Role of Interjurisdictional Competi-
tion in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law: A Second Look' University of Toronto
Law and Economics Working Paper 18 (Toronto 1993).
28 Daniels, supra note 3, 151-6. Daniels's empirical studies also uncovered some shifts
in incorporation patterns. The largest number of federal incorporations has
consistently come from Quebec firms, but the percentage of federal incorporations
from Quebec declined after 1980. For an explanation, Daniels looks to the
inclusion of CBCA reform provisions in the Quebec Companies Act in 1979 and
1980 as well as political factors. Ibid. 166-7. He also notes an acceleration of the
trend after an increase in the federal incorporation fee in 1985. Ibid. 168-9.
MacIntosh counters with a regression analysis of data on total federal and
provincial incorporations from 1979 to 1988 to test the hypotheses that each of a
significant provincial code reform along the lines of the CBCA and an increase in
federal incorporation fees relative to provincial fees will result in an increase in
provincial incorporations relative to federal incorporations. He finds support for
the latter proposition but not for the former.
29 Thus Romano construes the 1985 increase in the federal franchise fee as a signal
that the federal government cannot be expected to invest in a reputation for
responsiveness to corporate concerns. This account follows from her explanation of
Delaware and dovetails with her negative view of the desirability of federal
intervention in the United States.
30 Here again Romano draws on Daniels and Macintosh. See R. Daniels and J.
MacIntosh 'Capital Markets and the Law: The Particular Case of Canada' (1990) 3
Can. Investment Rev. 77, 80-1.
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controlling shareholders have the voting power to opt out of default
rules and therefore less incentive to pay a premium for a responsive
regime"l (pp. 124-5).
With Europe, the fact for explanation is the virtual absence of any
lawmaking behaviour that even arguably resembles American charter
competition. Romano sets out a long list of legal and institutional
barriers. First, reincorporation costs more in Europe. Since European
choice-of-law rules apply the law of the corporation's real rather than
nominal domicile, changing domiciles entails new capital investment
and the costs of transferring human capital (pp. 132-3). Also, Europe-
an reincorporations trigger taxes on hidden reserves (p. 133). Second,
European patterns of corporate regulation and equity capitalization do
not open up market opportunities for a revenue-seeking jurisdiction.
European systems have not allowed for much shareholder litigation,
and some restrict shareholder voting rights. This dampens demand for
responsive lawmaking along American lines (pp. 133-6). Scant demand
also results from the fact that the percentage of corporate capital
embodied in publicly traded equity remains small. Outside of Britain,
capital still tends to be raised privately from banks and equity owner-
ship tends to be concentrated (pp. 136-8). Third, Europe's normative
landscape is more complex. Labour codetermination in Germany and
statutory worker participation structures elsewhere create a barrier to a
regulatory system directed to the preferences of managers and share-
holders. In Romano's view, such schemes are unlikely to enhance
shareholder value (p. 130), and give rise to incentives on the part of
nations adopting them to prevent the emergence of active charter
competition (p. 132). Romano takes a similarly negative view of the
corporate and securities law harmonization project of the European
Union. This too dampens competition by mandating a floor and
reducing returns from innovation" (p. 132).
31 This explanation also shows up in Romano's description of American practices.
32 Romano, having done the comparative exercise, closes her book by addressing
claims that the competitive success of European andJapanese firms during the past
twenty years can be tied to their superior governance structures, in particular their
concentrated ownership and the practice of greater participation by financial
institutions. Romano responds, rightly in my view, that the claim is unproven. In
the absence of empirical studies tying governance structures to productivity, the
claim rests on the relative decline of American productivity growth. Romano
ascribes this to international convergence (pp. 140-1). While she does not oppose
the removal of legal constraints on active equity investment by American institu-
tions, she, again rightly in my view, makes no prediction about the scope of
institutional involvement that would follow from deregulation (pp. 144-7).
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Romano's direct comparison and joint disposition of Europe's
codetermination models and harmonization movement s3 has a parallel
in American discussions of worker participation and corporate law.
Participants in the American constituency rights debate have noted34
that competition directed to the satisfaction of management prefer-
ences prevents the states from mandating employee inclusion in their
domiciliary corporations, whether as beneficiaries of fiduciary duties or
holders of rights to be heard. The American case for worker rights thus
is tied to the case for federal intervention.
Calls for harmonization do not tend to figure into these American
discussions as an independent factor, however. Harmonization for its
own sake remains a relatively undeveloped theme in American cor-
porate law, 6 even though a single, national set of rules arguably would
lower information and compliance costs. But the lack of concern for
harmony does not follow from a consensus agreement on the proposi-
tion that competitive diversity redounds in overwhelming benefits. The
consensus, instead, centres on the smaller point that the system has
evolved so that diversity, taken alone, costs little." Delaware law func-
tions as the national corporations code on a de facto basis. 8 As a result,
most of the advantages of standardization are available to those firms
33 Romano's association of European codetermination and harmonization, while apt,
misses one point. Differing policies on codetermination among European nations
have created a major stumbling block to efforts to integrate corporate law. See
Richard M. Buxbaum and Klaus J. Hopt Legal Harmonization and the Business
Enterprise: Corporate and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the
U.S.A. (New York: Walter de Gruyter 1988) 259-62.
34 See Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1491-4; W. Bratton 'The Ethical Case Against the
Ethical Case for Constituency Rights' (1993) 50 Wash. & Lee LR 1449.
35 Romano is hostile to both propositions, given her basic assumption that both
shareholder primacy and jurisdictional competition have wealth-creating effects.
36 The practical exception is the Model Business Corporation Act, to which a majority
of the states adhere in one form or another, but which the larger states avoid.
Academic commentary on corporate law harmonization tends to be limited to the
comparative law context. See, e.g., Buxbaum and Hopt, supra note 33; Charny,
supra note 12.
37 Opinion does differ on externalities and the normative product of the competitive
system. If we characterize rule shopping that leads to suboptimal corporate
regulation as a cost of diversity, then there is no consensus favouring American
diversity. For a discussion of harmonization in which different types of legal rules
are distinguished as more or less well suited for harmonization or diversity, see
Charny, supra note 12, 436-51.
38 See B. Manning 'State Competition: Panel Response'(1987) 8 CardozoLR779, 783.
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that opt to accept them by incorporating in Delaware.39 Competition
with Delaware, in turn, reduces substantive diversity among the codes
of other states." The Canadian experience of the past two decades, at
least in Daniels's story, presents a variation on this theme.
B. COSTS AND LAWYERS
Romano's transaction-cost account of American charter competition
has been challenged. It has been suggested she errs on the high side in
her estimate of the costs of reincorporation and on the low side in her
estimate of the costs of Delaware domicile. She responds to these
challenges in the book, and, but for a few adjustments, her model
emerges intact.
1. Costs
Bernard Black has argued that Romano overemphasizes the impor-
tance of both reincorporation costs and Delaware's revenue-centred
commitment to respond to managers. In Black's story, reincorporation
is cheap and Delaware's advantage over other states is not that great.
Any other state can replicate cheaply the substantive provisions of
Delaware law simply by copying its code and directing its judges to
follow its case law.4 Companies stay in Delaware not because of cost
barriers to exit, but because it offers them what they want. Its 'modest'
advantage is ascribed to its expert judiciary and quick decision-time.4"
Romano responds that Black's numbers on the out-of-pocket costs of
reincorporation are too low, and points to her empirical finding that
only- 5 per cent of reincorporating firms did so more than once in a
two-decade period. She also takes issue with Black's refusal to factor in
the discounted value of the higher franchise taxes and higher attor-
neys' fees incurred by Delaware-bound firms in the years following their
moves, along with the concomitant opportunity costs (pp. 34-5 and
39 Some costs of duplicative regulation are incurred to the extent that individual
states, within the envelope left open by the commerce clause of the United States
constitution, choose to add layers of regulation on the internal affairs of foreign
corporations. California, and to a lesser extent New York, are the two states noted
for this activity.
40 Thus, putting all normative problems to one side, most agree that the benefits of
diversity do outweigh the costs. See Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1493-4.
41 This point derives from Coffee, supra note 15, 769.
42 Black, supra note 14, 551, 574, 586-90. This discussion appears in support of a
larger argument that corporate law is trivial. I disagree. Corporate law is not very
important in the broad scale of things, but it is not trivial.
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n1l). In Black's view these latter costs should not be taken into ac-
count, because they are tied to the particular destination of Delaware
and imply that a firm can incur negative transaction costs by moving
out of Delaware. That, he says, 'makes no sense.'43
Further, says Black, Romano overstates the importance of Delaware's
credible commitment to responsiveness. According to Black, corpora-
tions stay in Delaware because they like the service, and not because
Delaware's dependence on charter revenues makes it a hostage to their
interests. A contracting party needs a hostage, he says, only when the
counterparty's one-time gains from midstream opportunism could
outweigh its future losses from diminished reputation; if reincorpora-
tion costs little, midstream opportunism produces few gains, and the
hostage is superfluous."
Romano's account withstands this critique, but with a few modifica-
tions. Black makes a good point about the out-of-pocket costs of
reincorporation. Even with Romano's numbers, we are not talking
about much more than $500,000 per firm per move. Given a large
firm, these charges would not seem excessive as against a concrete
advantage perceived to stem from a reincorporation. But Black is less
persuasive when he excludes the discounted value of higher costs
attending Delaware incorporation. The positive financial return on
migration from Delaware implied by Black's low out-of-pocket cost
figures does make sense. If firms stay in Delaware despite the possibility
of an immediate increase in net cash flows elsewhere, then their
managers must highly value the less easily quantified benefits of a
Delaware domicile.' Romano's more capacious cost calculation better
describes this phenomenon.
Nor does Black quite succeed in trivializing the importance of
Delaware's credible commitment. First, the commitment still matters to
Delaware-bound firms at the time they decide to reincorporate. The
projected move entails both a one-time investment and a significant
increase in ongoing costs. Although exit protects the reincorporating
firm against subsequent policy changes in Delaware, it does not guaran-
tee a return on the firm's antecedent investment in a Delaware domi-
cile; the shorter the interval between reincorporation and exit, the
43 Black, supra note 14, 587.
44 Ibid. 588-9.
45 Romano, supra note 5, 246-9 (direct costs for largest firms of around $1 milion).
See Black, supra note 14, 588-91.
46 This in turn has negative implications for Black's triviality hypothesis.
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lower that investment's return. Delaware's commitment assures that
return at the time the firm invests its first dollar. Second, Black makes
the hostage superfluous by pointing out that the low cost of reincor-
poration makes it difficult for Delaware opportunistically to step up its
rents. But this covers only a part of the hostage story. The circumstan-
tial guaranty stemming from Delaware's dependence on franchise tax
revenues protects less against the possibility of midstream rent extrac-
tion than against the possibility of political change in the direction of
shareholder- or constituent-protective policies that disregard manage-
ment preferences. To the extent that Delaware stays management
responsive, it still can step up its rents so long as other states are
discouraged from investing in a competitive corporate law infrastruc-
ture. Of course, in Black's view, such an infrastructure could be put in
place with a single package of legislation. 7 The problem is that, given
Black's picture of low-cost reincorporation, even that investment would
be risky - the competing jurisdiction has no assurance that others will
not duplicate its efforts or that its new customers will stay.48 Delaware
thus retains a structural advantage.
But there remains a point for explanation. The bottom line of
Black's critique is that migration into Delaware is expensive, while
migration out is cheap. Recognition of the disparity provides some
support for his point about the fragility of Delaware's advantage. If
reincorporation, viewed in the broad scale of things, is cheap, then a
new element of uncertainty appears on the demand side of this pro-
duct competition picture. The question goes to the relative importance
to corporate consumers of good service in the near term and long-
term relational commitment. To the extent that Black is right and
Delaware's customers view the relationship as terminable at will,
Delaware's continuance in first place in the event of incidental infirmi-
ties in its service depends more on barriers to other states' entry than
on its position as hostage. Turning to the supply side of the picture,
47 The competing legislature would declare a policy of responsiveness, incorporate
some of Delaware's case law by reference, designate a special corporate court, limit
the tenure of its judges, and appoint some experienced corporate lawyers to it. It
would also, presumably, set about amending the state constitution to require a
supermajority legislative vote to amend the corporations code, and, in time, raise
franchise taxes and lower income taxes.
48 See Daniels, supra note 3, 182. Black, in contrast, argues that active competition is
unlikely, given high reincorporation costs, because the returns the competitor must
provide are that much higher. Black, supra note 14, 588. It is safe to conclude that
barriers to entry exist whatever the costs of reincorporation.
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this implies more insecurity in Delaware's position than we see describ-
ed in Romano's account.
But how insecure is Delaware? On the surface it has little cause for
concern. Although it gained its lead as an accident of political history,
no state has succeeded in wresting the lead away in the subsequent suc-
cession of political contexts. However awkward Delaware's confron-
tation with the most recent round of management-shareholder conflicts
- those that grew out of the takeover battles of the 1980s - it appears to
have retained its place.49 This continued success implies support for
Romano's emphasis on the importance of its long-term commitment to
its customers.
Furthermore, the isolation of an additional element of structural
insecurity only serves to underscore Romano's story of Delaware's
ongoing incentives to stay responsive. That very responsiveness in turn
discourages active competition. Even so, nothing embeds the system so
as to assure Delaware that its special long-term commitment will retain
relative importance as political contexts change in the future. Since the
precise extent of Delaware's competitive advantage is unknown and risk
aversion can be assumed on the part of the Delaware lawyers and law-
makers who have most at stake, insecurity of competitive position can
safely be emphasized as a variable that explains their ongoing beha-
viour.
2. Lawyers
Delaware's litigation rules are the great anomaly in the charter compe-
tition discussion. Delaware differs from many jurisdictions in not
requiring plaintiffs in shareholder derivative actions to post security for
expenses.5" It facilitates service of process on non-resident directors
with a broad consent to service statute. 1 It also is liberal in its fee
awards to derivative plaintiffs' lawyers: Under its non-pecuniary settle-
ment practice, defending managers can trade a high fee for a small
overall recovery.52 Thus, Delaware facilitates derivative litigation.
Having done so, it makes sure that the local bar gets a share of the ac-
tion by requiring that Delaware lawyers make appearances and filings.53
It also makes some concessions to managers. It ameliorates the litiga-
49 This assertion assumes that the reincorporation patterns described in Romano,
supra note 5, persisted without material alteration during the ensuing decade.
50 Del. R. Civ. Proc. 23.1 (1991).
51 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 sec. 3114 (1993).
52 Coffee, supra note 15, 761-2.
53 See Del. Sup. Ct. Rule 12, Del. Ch. Ct. Rule 170.
414 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
tion rules' immediate impact on them by allowing for liberal indemni-
fication. Its courts also have been inventive in recent years in placing
procedural barriers in the way of trial on the merits of derivative
claims,54 and these defendant-friendly procedures do discourage
litigation. But, because these process rules generate new legal disputes
as they discourage plaintiffs, they by no means counter Delaware's
reputation as a fee-generating centre for corporate lawyers.
Cary, who favoured strict fiduciary law control of management
conduct, acknowledged that Delaware's litigation rules did not synch-
ronize with the rest of his 'race to the bottom' description. He ex-
plained them as a special exception keyed to the interests of the
Delaware bar." The litigation rules are equally problematic for a strict
,race to the top' theory, since they expand the zone of legal control of
corporate actors at cost for the benefit of lawyers and therefore argu-
ably derogate from shareholder interests. 6 Similarly, it has been
suggested that the rules should be treated as an exception to Romano's
product-based description of Delaware's responsiveness. John Coffee
commented that revenue maximization for the bar amounts to a force
shaping Delaware law distinct from a desire to maximize its desirability
to consumers, leading to a product more indeterminate than that pre-
dicted by a simple revenue maximization model.57Jonathan Macey and
Geoffrey Miller expanded on that point, supplementing Romano's de-
mand-side model with a supply-side account of the role of interest-
group politics in the production of Delaware law.58
Macey and Miller question whether Delaware can be modelled as an
entity without further inquiry into the distribution of rents among inte-
rest groups within the state. Although all groups within the state have a
common interest in producing a desirable legal regime, they differ on
the relative proportions of costs imposed and revenues earned. The
taxpayers have an interest in higher direct costs (franchise tax reve-
nues) and lower indirect costs (legal fees). The lawyers' interest in fees
would be served by lower direct costs leading to a greater number of in-
corporations, and higher indirect legal costs even at the sacrifice of
some incorporations to the extent that the legal fees paid exceed those
lost. Macey and Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state acting purely
54 See Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata Gp. v. Maldonado 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981). For criticism of these and subsequent cases see Seligman 'New
Corporate Law' supra note 12, 23-6.
55 Cary, supra note 1, 686-8.
56 Macey and Miller, supra note 17, 510-11.
57 Coffee, supra note 15, 764.
58 Macey and Miller, supra note 17, 471-2.
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as a profit maximizer would limit indirect costs so as to maximize direct
costs.59 To account for Delaware's failure to conform to the product
model's predictions, they draw on interest group theory. Under the
public choice model, when groups in the state bid for regulations, the
legislature tends to benefit small, cohesive groups at the expense of the
general public. In Delaware, the organized bar has this advantage."
Macey and Miller add a second component to this market imperfec-
tion story. They draw on Romano's finding that lawyers (and to a lesser
extent investment bankers) play key roles in reincorporation decisions
and favour Delaware.6 Romano accounts for this by looking to the
lawyers' interest in lowering the cost of doing business by protecting
and maximizing returns from their capital investment in expertise in
Delaware law (pp. 43-4). Macey and Miller add that information
problems on the clients' part may present a barrier to competition
among the lawyers. If the clients have an information problem, then we
can account for Delaware's litigation rules as a shrewd marketing move
- a boon to those responsible for making reincorporation decisions.62
Romano, responding to Macey and Miller, acknowledges that the
Delaware bar has a special ability to influence legislation. But she
remains sceptical of their view that Delaware's litigation rules reflect a
significant agency problem between corporations and lawyers (p. 28).
She makes reference to a study of the results of derivative litigation in
which she found common practice patterns among federal courts,
Delaware courts, and other state courts, and minimal dollar returns to
shareholders across the board. She conjectures that Delaware may not
be more favourable to lawyers than other jurisdictions and that litiga-
tion practice may be unrelated to state competition" (p. 29). She
concludes with a return to the middle ground. The competitive system
is effective but not perfect: While Delaware's dominant market position
enables its bar to siphon off a share of the state's revenues and the law
facilitating this rent extraction decreases firm value, the trade-off will
not reach a point where a reincorporating firm is indifferent between
staying put and moving to Delaware (p. 30).
59 Ibid. 472-3, 498, 503-4.
60 Ibid. 504-8.
61 Romano, supra note 5, 273, 275 n2.
62 Macey and Miller, supra note 17, 486-7. They also cite the movement in Delaware
fiduciary law towards process scrutiny creating incentives for solicitation of
investment banker opinions. Ibid. 487.
63 Romano also sees significant common interests between lawyers and shareholders
in most circumstances, and looks to competition among lawyers to provide a floor
on lawyers' ability to use legal codes to benefit themselves (p. 30).
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This is a cogent response to Macey and Miller. A few points can be
added, however. First, shareholder interests can be aligned more
closely with those of litigating lawyers so as to diminish the magnitude
of the imperfection. Romano judges the value of derivative actions as a
monitoring device by comparing the bottom-line dollar returns to
shareholders and lawyers. But figures in court records do not present a
complete picture. Rules that facilitate derivative litigation increase the
incentive of managers to comply with fiduciary rules against self-
dealing by increasing the costs of non-compliance. They make it more
likely that risk-averse managers will consult with counsel for assessment
of legal risks before engaging in questionable transactions. Thus the
rules' value lies mostly in increased shareholder returns, net of those
legal fees, on capital that would be diverted to questionable projects if
litigation were a less active possibility.'
Second, rules that encourage litigation in Delaware play a secondary
role in production. Delaware's case law and judges figure prominently
in its substantive law product line.65 Its code's advantages are less
distinct than those of its cases, given statutory convergence among the
states. But Delaware does not completely control the production of
case law. The first option on the choice of the forum for new disputes
tends to lie with the plaintiff, and in many instances Delaware law
questions can be litigated in other states or in federal courts. This gives
Delaware a reason to offer incentives to plaintiffs. Their cooperation
gives Delaware the opportunity to apply its own law, preserving the first-
mover advantage and generating a flow of cases. These, in turn, are
products sold in the charter market.' Happily, the resulting business
generates incomes for Delaware's citizens.
64 W. Bratton 'The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation' (1992)
87 Nw. U. LR 180, 206-7; C. Yablon 'Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and
Executive Pay' (1992) 92 Colum. LR 1867, 1896-906. Delaware's non-pecuniary
settlement practice very well may be an ineffective means to the end of constraining
management at the planning stage, however. Management presumably will
anticipate that probable litigation includes the prospect of non-pecuniary settle-
ment and incorporate terms to be traded off in the settlement into the transaction.
65 In addition to a large collection of past decisions, Delaware sells a unique,
technically qualified judiciary and speedy determination of new disputes. Manning,
supra note 38, 784-5, identified the judiciary as the prime attraction, comparing
Delaware to the medieval law merchant.
66 This argument admittedly makes little sense to an observer sceptical of the value of
derivative litigation to shareholders. Under that view, Delaware here injures its
customers (both managers and shareholders) in the process of creating both its
product and the demand for it.
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Finally, there is evidence that the conflict between Delaware's
taxpayers and attorneys is either more nascent than actual or more
settled than active. Delaware's bar and legislature have a long-standing
'understanding' - amendments to the corporations code must first be
drafted and approved by the bar association's corporate law section and
the bar association itself.67 Active drafting and discussion is largely
limited to the corporate law section.'a The legislature rubber-stamps the
bar's recommendations; the executive branch's role is limited to
representation at bar association meetings on invitation.' These
arrangements do confirm Macey and Miller's emphasis on the orga-
nized bar's political power. But they also reinforce Romano's picture of
responsiveness. By delegating corporate matters to the bar, Delaware
removes them from its larger political life in order to keep corporate
law directed to the interests of corporate actors. The lawyers' expertise,
sensitivity to corporate politics, and financial interest make them
obvious delegees. An implicit deal certainly has been cut between the
lawyers and the rest of the state, and no doubt the lawyers had an
advantage at the table. But that deal was cut long ago, seems to work
well, and no one in Delaware seems inclined to disturb it. The practice
implies extraordinary cooperation due to shared interests.
Romano's figures on Delaware's franchise revenues support this
assertion. The franchise draw increased every year from 1977 to 1990,
from $57.9 million to $200.2 million. During that period, the per-
centage of total tax revenues contributed by the franchise tax remained
relatively stable, ranging between 12.5 per cent and 17.7 per cent 7' (pp.
7-8). At least right now, there seems to be plenty for everybody.
In sum, Romano justifiably treats Delaware as a unit for most
purposes in the discussion.
67 A. Moore 'State Competition: Panel Response' (1987) 8 Cardozo LR 779, 780-81.
68 C. Alva 'Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency'
(1990) 15 Delawarej of Corp. Law 885, 888-92. The section itself performs the
legislative function of sifting the comments of interested parties. Each of the three
largest corporate servicing firms have representatives to the section. Ibid. 888-92,
910.
69 Ibid. 988-92. See also D. Shaffer 'Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: How the
Market for Incorporation Shapes Corporate Law' (1987) 10 Harv. J. Law & Pub.
Pol. 665, 682-4.
70 Both measures show more volatility during the period 1960-1976. The high 17.7
percentage obtained in 1990, a recession year in the which legal fees probably
diminished.
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C. THE THREAT OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Cary's account of Delaware's litigation rules attributed a constraining
influence to the threat of federal intervention. Possible adverse political
consequences, he suggested, might disable Delaware from closing the
door to monitoring by shareholder plaintiffs, despite management
preferences.7 His point, applied more broadly, adds a political factor to
the list of forces that shape Delaware law: If Delaware's activities as the
leading state have the potential to excite political action at the national
level, then the preservation of its lead requires sensitivity to the re-
sponses of the actors and groups that influence federal law as well as to
management preferences. Two questions follow for the state competi-
tion discussion: First, whether the federal threat should be recognized
as a special influence on Delaware lawmaking, and second, whether
such recognition, with its addition of political demands to customer
demands, enervates the product competition model.
Factoring potential federal intervention into the model situates Dela-
ware between two threats - first, corporate migration out of the state
and entry into competition by other states, and, second, pre-emptive
federal intervention. Given two threats, Delaware becomes a hostage to
two potentially competing centres of interest. Managers constrain it
with charter revenues on one side; the federal government, which de-
pends on the proceeds of national income tax collections and there-
fore favours optimal corporate rules, constrains it on the other as a
proxy for the shareholder interest. The two threats may call for dif-
ferent responses, complicating the position of Delaware's lawmakers
and creating possibilities for competition by other states. The effect,
according to Eisenberg, is to give Delaware an incentive to avoid taking
the lead in the adoption of rules favouring managers at the share-
holders' expense. Other states have a different incentive. If they offer
innovative management-side payments they may siphon business from
Delaware; if the federal government intervenes to stop them, they lose
little. So long as a given state has a small market share, its actions
attract little attention. Delaware, in contrast, cannot take any signifi-
cant steps without close scrutiny nationwide.73 It remains under pres-
71 Cary, supra note 1, 688.
72 Eisenberg, supra note 4, 1512. Of course, the federal tax maximization incentive is
significantly more diluted than is Delaware's.
73 Ibid. 1512-3. See also Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1455, pointing out that there
remains a range on which states can manoeuvre without fear of federal interven-
tion.
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sure to follow new developments elsewhere, but emerges in a mediative
role.
The federal threat undeniably exists - it inheres in the constitutional
structure of the United States. But since it could be more hypothetical
than real, the magnitude of its influence on Delaware lawmaking is
open to empirical dispute.74 Certainly, its form and intensity varies from
period to period. Federal intervention was a present prospect in the
late 1970s. 75 But calls for blanket intervention by academics and federal
politicians fell off after 1980.76 An active federal politics on takeovers
followed - proposals to constrain either takeovers or takeover defences
were on the congressional agenda throughout the 1980s.77 But this
activity did not markedly threaten Delaware. Enactments were rare and
incidental in scope. Furthermore, political actors with agendas hostile
to Delaware did not play a leading role. Romano shows this with surveys
both of the content of federal takeover legislation proposed during the
period 1969-87 and of interest group representation in the accompany-
ing legislative processes (pp. 76-81). She finds that the overwhelming
majority of bills had an anti-bidder aspect and that management voices
appeared much more frequently than shareholder or labour voices.78
Employing the federal threat in accounting for Delaware law develop-
ments after the early 1980s, then, depends heavily on an assumption of
extreme risk aversion in Delaware's lawyers and judges. But the assump-
tion is plausible. These actors have large stakes in the status quo, and
can be expected to be mindful of the reactions of federal actors even
during quiet intervals.
The best evidence of the federal threat's influence lies in the pattern
of the law itself. The Delaware judiciary abruptly changed its habit of
monolithic fidelity to management's interests in 1977 with Singer v.
Magnavox Co.79 Cary's 1975 article has been accorded a role in the
74 Macey and Miller noted that no existing theory provides a complete account of
Delaware law; we can identify relevant variables and specify their interactions, but
falsification is difficult. Macey and Miller, supra note 17, 509-10.
75 See notes 79-81 infra.
76 They did not entirely disappear, however. See D. Schwartz 'Federalism and
Corporate Governance' (1984) 45 Ohio State LJ545.
77 Romano offers a succinct account of these events (pp. 75-81).
78 Bureaucratic, political, and academic voices were heard in quantity, however (p. 77).
79 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). That case imposed strict fiduciary standards on parent
firms in cash-out mergers. The Singer rule was in turn rejected for a looser, process-
based approach in Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Oddly, Singer
came down after the immediate threat of federal pre-emption of state fiduciary
rules under the anti-fraud rules of the securities laws had been removed by the
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break."0 Although the article did not result in federal intervention,
many believe that it crystallized the threat. In turn, that development
impressed upon the Delaware courts the practical importance of
solicitude to shareholder interests."1 This post-Cary behaviour pattern
continued and still yields headlines. Famous cases like Unocal,
2 Revlon,13
Smith v. Van Gorkom,84 and the more recent Cede & Co. v. Technicolor 5
and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 6 each articu-
late surprising new shareholder-protective applications of basic fiduci-
ary rules. But the pattern has been volatile, and shareholder-protective
intervention has been a more intermittent than constant theme.
Equally famous cases such as Weinberger,7 Moran v. Household Internation-
a/,4 and Time-Warners9 restrict the application of the new rules. The
legislature, prompted as always by the corporate committee of the state
bar, entered on management's side in one famous instance. After Smith
v. Van Gorkum's application of the duty of care caused nervousness in
Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries v. Green 430 US 462 (1977). The story told at
the time was that the brush with pre-emption at the hands of the federal judiciary
and the wider critical atmosphere provoked by Cary and others had prompted the
Delaware Supreme Court to reverse its direction and become more accommodating
of the interests of investors so as to diminish the threat of intervention.
80 The federal threat, and Cary's association with it, shows up in accounts of these
events, most notably those of Coffee, supra note 15, 764-6, and Eisenberg, supra
note 4, 1511-3.
81 Prior to Santa Fe Industries supra note 79, there was a cognizable chance that much
conduct covered by state fiduciary law would be found to be 'manipulative' or
'fraudulent' conduct violative of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and rule 10b-5 thereunder. The anti-managerial political climate of the time
also resulted in the introduction of pre-emptive legislation in Congress. See
Metzenbaum Bill of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
82 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (expanded review of
tender-offer defensive tactics under proportionality test).
83 Revlon, Inc. v. MacA ndrews &Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (duty of
management defending tender offer to auction company in limited circumstances).
84 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (sudden expansive application of duty of care to board
approval of arm's-length merger).
85 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (strengthened duty of care applied to boardroom merger
decision with suggestion of expanded remedial concept inclusive of post-merger
gain).
86 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (obligation to achieve best value reasonably available for
shareholders).
87 Supra note 79 (overruling Singer in favour of less restrictive process scrutiny of
cash-out mergers).
88 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (sustaining poison-pill defence under Unocal).
89 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (limiting
application of Unocal and Revlon).
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boardrooms and a substantial increase in insurance premiums, the
legislature amended the code to permit firms to opt out of the duty of
care by charter amendment."
Delaware lawmakers confirm that the federal threat influences this
erratic back-and-forth shift between management and shareholder inte-
rests. Cary accused the Delaware judiciary of being the agents of a cor-
rupt sovereign - integrity was wanting in their fiduciary decisions, he
said; there was no 'public policy' left in their law other than the
objective of raising revenue.91 They have responded to the accusation
with public representations of role integrity.92 They describe themselves
as mediators between management and shareholders - protectors of
market risk-taking who nevertheless impose ethical constraints.93 Dela-
ware, in their description, seeks middle ground, pressured by the fede-
ral government on one side and management incorporation decisions
on the other.94 The Delaware bar's concern about federal responses is
confirmed in accounts of its deliberations on new legislation."
It thus can safely be said that Delaware actors remain sensitive to
federal pre-emptive power and averse to the prospect of intervention.
But, like the role of interest-group conflict, the precise role of the
federal threat in their activities is hard to measure. Worse, it is easily
overstated. There are a number of problems. First, the gravity of the
threat varies with the particular form of intervention proposed. A dis-
crete provision, such as the all-holders rule9" or the special tax on
greenmail profits,97 only incidentally impairs Delaware's position. Such
90 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, sec. 102(b)(7) (1991) (permitting opting out of personal
liability for directors for duty-of-care violations). For an excellent discussion, see
Romano 'Aftermath of Insurance Crisis' supra note 9.
91 Cary, supra note 1, 684, 696-8.
92 The term comes from Coffee, supra note 15, 764-5.
93 Moore, supra note 67, 779-800 (Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court).
94 W. Quillen 'The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship - A Response to
Professor Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law'
(1993) 59 Brooklyn LR 107, 129 (former Delaware Chancellor and Supreme Court
Justice, now Secretary of State).
95 When the bar first considered (and rejected) an anti-takeover statute, it received
comment letters from Martin Lipton and Joseph Flom warning that enactment
might excite federal intervention. Such worries were expressed at the committee
meeting on the proposal. Alva, supra note 68, 906-8.
96 Rule 14d-10 under section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 CFR
240.14d-10 (1993), provides that any tender offer must be open to all holders of
the subject class of securities, pre-empting the defensive tactic sustained in UnocaL
97 Internal Revenue Code, section 5881 (1991), enacted in 1987, imposes a 50 per
cent excise tax on profit realized in a greenmail transaction.
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provisions block a particular management accommodation, but apply
the block to all fifty states. Delaware no longer can take a competitive
lead on the subject matter regulated, but neither can any other state.
The overall field of subject matter for competition shrinks slightly, but
not enough cognizably to impair Delaware's position. Furthermore, a
federal provision might even result in a short-term enhancement of
Delaware's position. Consider the national control-share-acquisition sta-
tute proposed during the 1980s (p. 78). During the mid-1980s, the
federal threat contributed to Delaware's hesitancy to initiate takeover
defence legislation. Federal intervention on either 'side would have
settled the matter, removing a threat of competition from other states.
It would take a more far-reaching federal intervention, such as federal
chartering or fiduciary standards, to cause immediate structural change
in the state market."8 The more sweeping the intervention, the lower its
probability.
Second, developments that invite ascription to the federal threat
admit of multiple explanations. Most of the significant developments
in corporate law during the past fifteen years concern corporate-
control transactions. During that time, Delaware's lawmakers had no
widely accepted policy blueprint to resolve the resulting disputes. The
background political and economic noise' makes it plausible to turn to
Romano's model and conclude that Delaware simply tried its best to
maintain its advantages in the eyes of managers and stay responsive to
shareholders at a time when it was impossible to do both.'0° More
particularly, Romano explains Delaware's failure to follow the more
zealous anti-takeover states in terms of balanced power among interest
groups. She sees three factors at work: Delaware's large population of
corporations makes it home to potential bidders as well as potential
defenders; the large population makes it difficult for a subclass of
defending managers to seize control of the legislative process; and, the
practice of bar association approval of new legislation assures balance
in i.nterest-group representation in the legislative process (pp. 59-60).
98 Federal fiduciary standards for public corporations could cause an outbreak of
price competition. Statutory convergence and the proliferation of enabling rules
make state codes almost fungible. Federalization of the most heavily litigated areas
of subject matter would denude Delaware of a primary product component and
remove a justification for its premium price.
99 For political discussions of the takeover cases, see L. Johnson 'The Delaware
Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Law' (1990) 68 Texas LR 865;J.
Gordon 'Corporations, Markets, and Courts' (1991) 91 Colum. LR 1931.
100 Macey and Miller, in contrast, interpret many of these events in terms of their
favourable impact on the flow of legal fees. Macey and Miller, supra note 17.
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Finally, the impact of Delaware's cluster of leading shareholder-
favourable cases may have been overemphasized. On this reading,
which originates from a position very close to Cary on the Winter-Cary
scale, Delaware dresses the windows to defuse the federal threat and
then goes on with business as usual. In highly publicized cases the
Delaware courts take the opportunity to announce vague rules that
hold out the prospect of enhancement of shareholder value. But in the
less well-publicized cases that follow, the courts take the opportunities
held out by complex facts to refrain from applying the vague rules in
management-constraining ways."' Concrete results count for more than
public statements, and the lawyers who make reincorporation decisions
keep score.
Despite these objections, the federal threat adds plausibility to
accounts of Delaware's volatile lawmaking. As Delaware responded to
events in the corporate control market, it kept open its options by
employing equivocal judicial rules in preference to clear-cut legislation.
It did so at apparent cost to its reputation for certainty, predictability,
and management responsiveness. The insertion of a political variable
rationalizes the pattern. Moreover, the political middle ground on
which Delaware's lawmakers see themselves overlaps with the normative
middle ground described by Romano.
But the overlap does not import identity. The political model's
explanatory advantages lie largely on the supply side. From the demand
side, it presents a puzzle. Delaware's mediative output can be explained
in terms of the interests of managers as a group - well-timed interven-
tions to protect shareholders -serve to defuse the federal threat and to
make Delaware a buffer state that protects corporations from federal
intervention.0" But the benefits of a mediative jurisprudence are more
questionable from the point of view of individual managers seeking an
optimal environment. They have an apparent incentive to cause their
firms to migrate to states adopting less equivocal anti-takeover policies,
riding free on the firms that stay.0 3
101 For a reading of the cases after Unocal along these lines, see V. Brudney and W.
Bratton Brudney & Chirelstein's Cases and Materials on Corporate Finance- 4th ed.
(Westbury: Foundation Press 1993) 1087-95, 1129-30.
102 Federal corporate law holds open the prospect of not only stricter fiduciary rules
but inclusion of interest group agendas, such as labour codetermination, blocked
under the state competition system.
103 Note that if a large number of firms surmounted this collective-action barrier and
successfully shopped for a more responsive jurisdiction, federal intervention
becomes more likely. The same thing might happen if a large number of firms left
Delaware, starting a new race to the bottom.
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If this collective-action problem exists, then Delaware should have
seen some erosion of its market share, given the low cost of departure.
But Romano's figures on Delaware's franchise tax revenues, which con-
tinue to increase both in absolute amounts and as a share of total state
revenues, imply that Delaware has not lost significant market share (pp.
7-11). A number of explanations can be offered. First, the opinions of
lawyers and investment bankers may still carry great weight. These
actors may bring political sensitivity to their recommendations - an ex-
perienced astuteness that happily coincides with an interest in protect-
ing their own investments in human capital. Second, no full-service
alternative domicile exists. As we have seen, no other jurisdiction has
particularly strong incentives to incur the start-up costs to market a full-
service operation. Third, the self-protective capacity of shareholders
may now be strong enough to deter management reincorporation pro-
posals. Beginning in the late 1980s, incidents of shareholder resistance
caused managers to drop the assumption of automatic shareholder ap-
proval of anti-takeover proposals requiring charter amendment. Ro-
mano contributes some additional evidence of this phenomenon with a
report on the behaviour of public corporations subject to the Pennsyl-
vania 1990 takeover statute. The Pennsylvania statute, like most take-
over statutes, included a default rule that applied it to all corporations
that took no affirmative action to opt out. Despite this, pressure from
institutional investors resulted in opting out by the boards of 127 firms;
only 72 firms stayed in (pp. 68-9). Presumably, opportunistic reincor-
poration proposals would excite similar shareholder attention. Thus,
departure from Delaware may not be the open option it used to be,
however insignificant the out-of-pocket costs entailed.
This review of the demand-side implications of Delaware's respon-
siveness to federal politics suggests a modified description of Dela-
ware's product. It seems Delaware can sell a more even-handed media-
tion between management and shareholders, despite enhanced man-
agement solicitude in other jurisdictions. In this new equilibrium
picture, Delaware must cope with structural insecurity on both the
demand side and the political side, but can maintain and perhaps even
strengthen its position to the extent it avoids innovations that sharply
point in the direction of either shareholder or management interests.
We return by indirection to the shop-worn point that firms want
stability and certainty. These properties remain a part of Delaware's
ideal product, even as events make the ideal's realization difficult.
Despite all the noise on the screen, however, Delaware never steps far
from the status quo for long.
This integration of the federal threat into the description of Dela-
ware lawmaking has awkward implications for observers with significant
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normative objections to the legal status quo. Consider first an advocate
of full-scale federal intervention. Under the dual-threat model, the
federal threat reinforces the shareholder voice, moving Delaware law in
the direction of shareholder value enhancement. The stronger the
threat, the more pronounced the move. But Delaware miminizes the
impact of each such move, defusing the threat of constraint while pro-
viding management with maximum feasible protection of its own prero-
gatives. Now compare an opponent of federal intervention who takes
the position that shareholder value is best realized by market con-
straints and minimal regulation. This observer, while disposed to wel-
come the shareholder-protective aspects of Delaware's takeover cases,
will prefer not to ascribe them to threatened regulation. Incidental
benefits from threatened regulation imply substantial benefits from
actual regulation, and cast doubt on the efficacy of state competition.
Romano fits the latter profile. She acknowledges the about-face in
Delaware's position as management-protective innovator - from leader
to laggard on the anti-takeover front (p. 67). But her account does not
mention Delaware's awkward posture as lightning-rod for federal inter-
vention."0 4 Instead, she takes the position that shareholder-protective
federal intervention is unlikely as a practical matter, supporting the
point with data on past reform politics that show a management bias at
the federal level. As already noted, she then ascribes Delaware's equi-
vocation on takeovers to local factors that affect the play of interest-
group politics.05
These are important points. But a low-probability assessment on
actual federal intervention does not, taken alone, make it implausible
to include the federal threat in descriptions of Delaware law. Dela-
ware's stakes are high enough and its juridical position fragile enough
to make it sensitive to remote contingencies. And, despite her probabil-
ity assessment, Romano takes the subject of federal intervention very
seriously, as the discussion of her normative views in part II will indi-
cate. An explanation of the omission of politics from Romano's descrip-
tion of Delaware law follows from that discussion.
D. SUMMARY
Romano's product-competition model of corporate law has remarkable
resiliency. It either accommodates or provides a base for a plausible
counter to each of the additional factors brought to bear against it as
104 The explanation also is omitted from Romano's discussion of the even-handed
record of the Delaware courts on takeover related matters (pp. 72-3).
105 See earlier discussion, note 100.
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critical supplements - the low cost of reincorporation, interest-group
politics, and the federal threat. Romano resists the reincorporation-
cost point, but her model can accommodate it without strain. She
accepts the possibility that lawyers' rents may be a suboptimal aspect of
the system, a concession her model permits. In contrast, she passes over
the federal threat, offering a plausible alternative explanation for the
law's development without addressing the point expressly. But since
federal politics are an acknowledged variable in the state law calculus,
they ought to be included in the description absent a strong contrary
justification. The product competition we see occurs in a complex
juridical framework that has its own path dependencies and that
remains subject to political influences. Recognition of Delaware's
sensitivity to federal responses does highlight a limitation on the
competitive system's operations, but does so without negating the
usefulness of the product competition analogy. It ought to be in the
description, whatever the observer's ultimate normative judgment.
II Charter competition and federal intervention
On Romano's middle ground, the anti-takeover legislation enacted by
the states during the last fifteen years is demarked as a zone of charter-
market failure. The demarcation implies a case for actual federal
intervention. Romano takes up this argument at the core of The Genius
of American Corporate Law. She offers a succinct and thorough treatment
of the problem, along with a strongly stated recommendation against
federal intervention (pp. 52-84).
A. ANTI-TAKEOVER LEGISLATION AND THE NEW CASE
FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
The Genius ofAmerican Corporate Law surveys the anti-takeover statutes,"6
106 The statutes evolved in succeeding generations. The first generation submitted
tender offers to substantive review by state securities administrators, and were held
unconstitutional under the commerce clause in Edgarv. MITE 457 US 624 (1982)
(Romano pp. 53-5). The second generation limited the subject matter to regula-
tion of internal corporate affairs. These statutes tend to condition the voting right
of bidders on the approval of the shareholders as a whole, to impose freeze periods
on combinations between bidders and targets, or to require that an equal price be
paid in the second stage of a two-tier acquisition. Some statutes combine these
elements. These statues have survived constitutional challenge under CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America 481 US 69 (1989). (Romano pp. 55-7). Another variety
confirms the legitimacy of board consideration of the interests of constituents other
than shareholders in takeover defence situations (pp. 74-5).
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their origins as interest-group legislation, °7 and empirical work that
confirms their harmful effect on shareholder value.0" Romano con-
cedes that 'unanimity in the enactment of takeover statutes may
represent a disadvantage of federalism,' because the legislation's
burdens spill over to citizens of other states. In theory, then, they give
rise to a case for national regulation"° (p. 59).
Others, principally Lucian Bebchuk,"' have gone on to articulate
this theoretical case. Bebchuk argues that the middle-ground". result
stems from a structural defect in the competitive system that disables
the production of a maximizing legal regime. The defect lies in the
competing states' concern for management preferences rather than
shareholder value itself. The market causes the states to focus on the
variables that influence reincorporation decisions," 2 but does not add
controls that force the states to exclude policies of management
accommodation' from the reincorporation package. Specifically, a
category of 'insignificantly redistributive' management-favourable rules
always escapes the market constraint. Bebchuk hypothesizes a transac-
tion undertaken by a $1 billion firm that reduces shareholder value by
$1 million for the purpose of returning $200,000 to management. The
transaction is too small to excite a takeover; but so long as state law
107 Romano's case study of the state legislative process here suggests that the statutes
are initiated by threatened managers of local corporations and their assistants in
the local corporate bar rather than by broad coalitions of business, labour and
community leaders (pp. 57-9).
108 This is a complex picture requiring additional reference to negative price effects of
contractual anti-takeover provisions such as poison pills. Significant showings of
negative price effects do appear. Romano summarizes the large body of work (pp.
60-7).
109 Romano distances herself from commentators who have asserted a causal connec-
tion between this legislation and the fall-off in merger activity after 1989. She
ascribes the disappearance of takeovers to tight credit and the effect of tighter
regulations on institutional portfolios ofjunk bonds (pp. 70, 72 n37). It should be
noted that the literature on the interests of corporate constituents provides
groundwork for a theoretical case in favour of some anti-takeover legislation. See,
e.g., B. Chapman 'Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary
Obligation' (1993) 43 UTLJ547. The discussion here reserves on that question and
assumes that shareholder primacy is the end to be obtained.
110 Bebchuk, supra note 12. See also Charny, supra note 12; Coffee, supra note 15,
770-2; Seligman 'New Corporate Law' supra note 12; Seligman 'Federal Minimum
Standards' supra note 12.
111 Bebchuk begins his analysis of the problem by stating his assumption that, absent
reasons to the contrary, state competition is more likely to produce an efficient rule
than federal regulation. Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1457.
112 Ibid. 1452, 1454.
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opens the door, management has every incentive to undertake it."' In
addition, competition can cause the states to use their lawmaking
power to impair the strength of market discipline even further, as the
proliferation of anti-takeover statutes demonstrates."' Bebchuk recom-
mends federal pre-emption of much state takeover regulation and
federal fiduciary standards."'
Bebchuk engages with Romano in making this case. The engage-
ment begins with the body of event studies that show either an increase
in value on reincorporation to Delaware or no significant effect. Beb-
chuk must confront these results, since the structural defect he identi-
fies lies in the competing states' tendency to focus on reincorporation
decisions. He does so, prompting a rebuttal in Romano's book.
Bebchuk brings to bear standard questions about the constraining
effect of the shareholder vote on which reincorporation is conditioned.
The shareholders may approve a move even though Delaware has
value-decreasing rules either because the move on the whole increases
shareholder value, the shareholders have inadequate information, or
management has tied the move to another corporate action they
desire." 6 These problems limit the normative force of the event studies:
The stock prices may reflect the market's reaction to the developments
signalled by the reincorporation rather than the reincorporation itself,
and managers may systematically choose to reincorporate at moments
when such information exists."' Romano, who has always recognized
the former possibility, responds that it is 'improbable' that information
tied to the move could swamp an otherwise negative stock price effect;
if management were manipulating the process, price-negative rather
than price-neutral results should obtain for firms reincorporating for
management-favourable purposes (p. 18). Bebchuk, following others,"8
113 Ibid. 1462-3, 1468, 1488. Bebchuk also argues that suboptimal rules result in cases
where the firm inflicts externalities on interest groups other than the shareholders.
Ibid. 1485.
114 Ibid. 1467. See also Coffee, supra note 15, 770-2; Macey and Miller, supra note 17,
471,483.
115 The recommendation for fiduciary standards is the more difficult of the two, given
the strong empirical case supporting pre-emption of anti-takeover legislation.
116 Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1460, 1471.
117 Ibid. 1449-50. See also Romano, supra note 5, 267; Coffee, supra note 15, 767-8;
Macey and Miller, supra note 17, 482.
118 Coffee, supra note 15, 767-8; Eisenberg, supra note 4, 1508; Macey and Miller,
supra note 17, 482-3. Coffee adds two additional points. First, information
asymmetry between management and shareholders makes the reincorporation
signal noisy; the shareholders only know of the motivations disclosed. Second, the
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anticipates this point: Given convergence among the state codes, the
absence of negative returns may only mean that the legal rules of the
original and destination state are equally harmful. Furthermore, the
fact that reincorporation does not decrease value overall does not
prove that competition produces desirable results on all corporate
issues."9
Bebchuk, in sum, argues that the event studies must be seen in
temporal perspective. They do contradict Cary's picture of an ever-
lowering race to the bottom with Delaware in the lead. But once we
accept that point and join Romano on the middle ground, their
probative force diminishes. The race, in effect, bottomed out before
the studies were undertaken. The prospective question is whether
intervention can cause the numbers to improve.
In Romano's view, acknowledgment of disproof of the 'race to the
bottom' picture decides the debate over intervention. Given agreement
on the beneficial effects of competition, she says, the burden is on
advocates of intervention to 'demonstrate empirically which particular
code provisions harm shareholders and why national legislation would
be more likely to alleviate the problem' (p. 19). This allocation of an
empirical burden of proof to the interventionists is the book's principal
normative assertion.
B. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Why, given Bebchuk's identification of a structural infirmity in the
competitive system and the powerful empirical backing of studies
showing negative price effects of anti-takeover regulation, should the
burden of proof be on the advocates of intervention? It would seem
that the burden should lie in the other direction as to takeovers and lie
evenly with respect to the rest of fiduciary law, clearing the table for
consideration of particular reform proposals.
Romano's case to the contrary brings together two theoretical
assertions and a practical political observation. First, drawing on a
public-choice view of the lawmaking process, she contends thatjurisdic-
tional competition almost always works better than central regulation.
Second, drawing on the contractual theory of the firm, she projects an
ideal corporate law system based on free choice and implies that
federal mandates would interfere with the realization of the ideal.
discounted value of transaction-cost savings resulting from a move to Delaware is
trivial, leaving the stock price to the influence of transaction-specific inferences.
119 Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1449-50.
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Third, she observes that federal lawmaking processes are impaired by
the same interest-group influences that impair state lawmaking pro-
cesses. Accordingly, the chances of benefits from federal intervention
are small and the risks of harm are great. These contentions are
considered below.
1. The merits of state competition versus the infirmities offederal lawmaking
Romano's position on federal intervention draws in the first instance
on a broader description of the benefits of jurisdictional competition.
Under this view, competition causes government policies to be match-
ed with diverse citizen preferences (pp. 4-5). Citizens signal their
preferences respecting legal goods and services when they migrate
from regime to regime. Their ability to exit also disempowers govern-
ment actors, whose welfare diminishes as citizens depart, taking along
votes and revenues."2 In a federal system, the allocation of lawmaking
power to the competing states also protects individuals from the power
of the national government.' Finally, competition fosters innovation
(pp. 4-5). Law production goes forward without time consumed on the
task of reconciling competing preferences. This picture imports a cor-
respondingly negative view of the efficacy of centralized lawmaking.
Since the revenue-enhancement constraint on the central government
is less intense (p. 48), the central lawmaking process will be slower, less
responsive to productive concerns, and more susceptible to the influ-
ence of organized interest groups. It thus is more likely to make
mistakes, is less able to correct them, and should be invoked only when
an externality has been demonstrated (p. 5).
Romano complements this theory with a practical projection of the
likely direction of any future federal corporate law politics" Since
corporate law reform is not at the top of the congressional policy
agenda and the voting public is indifferent to it, a federal corporate
lawmaking process will be subject to the same management influences
that prevail in the states (p. 50). Managers remain concentrated and
easily organized, and have powerful financial incentives for political
action. Shareholders remain diffuse, are much less easily organized,
and have less intense incentives for political action. Thus, movement to
120 Daniels, supra note 3, 142-3.
121 In Romano's view, private organizations provide an additional check by counter-
balancing the power of state governments. National regulation of corporations
would impair this corporate function and thus detract from individual liberty.
Romano 'State Competition Debate,' supra note 9, 753 n97.
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the national level does not change the interest-group picture (pp.
75-6). Romano backs up this projection with empirical surveys of past
takeover legislation proposed at the federal level and interest-group
participation in the accompanying legislative processes (pp. 76-80).
She shows that the management voice was much more evident than the
shareholder voice. Of course, management's organizational advantages
did not precipitate success at the federal level during the 1980s, in
contrast to results at the state level. Romano acknowledges this, but
ascribes it to the opposition of the Reagan and Bush administrations
and the managers' very success in getting what they wanted in the states
(p. 80). She concludes that further national legislation is no more likely
to foster a free market for corporate control than is state legislation (p.
82), and warns that federal activity could even be counterproductive.
She also cites two ameliorating factors in the state law picture: First,
Delaware's equivocal position, embodied in less restrictive legislation
and a relatively even-handed judicial approach (pp. 59-60, 72-4); and,
second, the demonstrated role of institutional investor pressure in
forcing opting out by the majority of the firms subject to the most
restrictive statute, Pennsylvania's 1990 enactment. This market con-
straint, she suggests, may amount to a possible floor on deleterious
state competition (pp. 68-70). This safety net built into the state system
remains absent in the federal" (pp. 82-3).
The problem with Romano's practical projection is that it avoids
direct confrontation with the theoretical question: Whether federal
intervention could improve the results of the state competition system
without impairing its productive components. Today's interventionists
assert that, in theory, we possess a normative paradigm robust enough
to isolate a systemic failure in the charter market's operation and guide
us to effective federal remedies. This theoretical case is not rebutted by
reference to the overall infirmities of centralized lawmaking. In the
case of charter competition, exit from one jurisdiction does not remedy*
the dissatisfactions of the group of actors disadvantaged by regulation.
Due to the peculiarities of the America's constitutional structure, each
of the competing jurisdictions has national lawmaking power over the
shareholders of its domiciliary corporations. Competition, accordingly,
has not sorted out the problem of competing preferences by offering a
viable .menu of choices. Instead, it resolves the conflicts in only one
way. Additional time spent to resolve the problem at the level of the
central government presumably would be well invested.
122 See also Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 4, 218.
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Romano's political projection comes to bear at this point to cut off
the discussion - time invested in federal corporate law reform is both
pointless and dangerous. This preclusive reference to political realities
gives rise to two questions. The first goes to the risks of political discus-
sion: Whether, as a structural proposition, federal-level political pro-
cesses are as management-biased as state-level processes. The second
goes to the returns: Whether pressure for federal intervention has
beneficent effects taken alone.
As to the risks, federal processes, being central and highly visible,
allow for economies in the costs of interest-group participation and
incentives for participation by actors disposed to favour shareholders,
such as academics. They thus create an opportunity for the weaker
shareholder voice to be heard. Romano's statistics on witnesses at
congressional hearings on takeover legislation during the period
1963-1987 do not refute this point. They show that the federal govern-
ment's witnesses participated in 80 per cent of the hearings, target
managements' in 60 per cent, academic witnesses in 48 per cent,
labour's in 25 per cent, takeover bidders' in 20 per cent, arid share-
holder groups' in 3 per cent (p. 77). These numbers imply that the
inputs were not greatly imbalanced, if we can assume that substantial
numbers of government, academic, and bidder witnesses argued from
the point of view of shareholder value maximization or expressed
positions consistent with it.12s Moreover, organized shareholder activity
has noticeably increased since 1987.124 As shareholder activists accumu-
late a record of influence on boardroom decisions, their influence in
Washington will grow.
Management influence over state processes remains stronger
because charter competition inheres in the structure of state law. This
situation will not change so long as management retains agenda control
over reincorporation decisions. The federal government's failure to buy
management's anti-takeover line - despite twenty years of pushing -
corroborates the point. 25 Nor does federal resistance to management
influences depend entirely on free market policies peculiar to the
Reagan and Bush administrations. The Securities and Exchange
123 Admittedly, Romano's data on. the bills proposed show a heavy bias towards
management-responsive proposals.
124 This activity has prompted a revision of the SEC's proxy rules to permit greater
communication between shareholders.
125 Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1502-4.
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Commission builds in a powerful voice motivated by an entrenched
interest in shareholder protection and habitual suspicion of manage-
ment initiatives.
As to the possible returns from political dialogue, it certainly can be
conceded that federal legislation is not in prospect. But perhaps inter-
vention should be a constant topic of discussion nevertheless. Justas
interventionist talk creates a risk of bad legislation, so an absence of
such talk creates a risk of a political shift in management's favour at the
state level. Delaware's lawmakers have acknowledged that their recent
tendency towards a more even-handed mediation between shareholder
and management interests stems from a fear of federal intervention.
Were the interventionist voice to fade out of the political landscape,
Delaware would be freer to match management-protective innovations
elsewhere. Fortunately, the new shareholder voices make it less likely
that Delaware's intermediate position will cause it to lose incorpora-
tions to these other states. But, absent the federal threat, a more
management-responsive posture could be the most risk-averse course
for Delaware to follow. Calls for federal intervention support the state
safety net to which Romano refers.
This whole discussion plays on the indeterminate connection
between academic theory and political practice. Just as Romano's call
for unmitigated state competition could play into management's hands
if universalized, so academic calls for intervention could result in an
active federal process subject to management capture. The solution to
the problem lies with a practical appraisal of both risks. Since neither
side will likely be silenced by the other anytime soon, and federal
intervention is itself a distant prospect, neither risk looms large. The
risks counterbalance one another in any event. The theory talk should
proceed.
2. The contractual ideal
As noted, Romano's theory has an apparent gap - an answer to the
question whether federal legislation could be enacted that could move
us closer to the optimal side of the middle ground, preserving the re-
sponsive benefits of the state system while constraining its susceptibility
to management manipulation. Romano addresses this point indirectly
by reviewing the debate over the mandatory and enabling terms of
corporate law and taking a stand against any mandate, state or federal.
The case against mandatory corporate law follows from an ideal view
of the firm. Under this view, firm participants are no different from any
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other contract parties and should negotiate their own governance
rules. The ideal is manifested in a policy prescription - corporate law
should replicate the provisions that private parties would have made in
a costless environment, and actual bargains made between contracting
parties should trump hypothetical bargains made available by law.
Thus, corporate law should be enabling and suppletory only;"6 actors
should be able to 'opt out.'
Debate over this prescription goes to the appropriate scope of the
opting-out permission. The majority view lies against unqualified
extension of an opting-out privilege," 7 with the discussion turning on
charter amendments that waive application of management fiduciary
duties. These present the hard case for opting out, because process
defects make the charter amendment process suspect. As with reincor-
poration decisions, shareholders have a collective-action problem when
managers propose charter amendments. Small stakes make it irrational
for individual holders to invest in information acquisition." Moreover,
managers, by virtue of their agenda control, easily can turn the share-
holder's disadvantaged negotiating position to advantage."a The
upshot, in the majority view, is a classic contract failure: The sharehold-
ers rationally vote to approve an amendment that is value-decreasing to
them. As a result, the amendment process is deemed reliable as to
amendments that are company-specific and transaction-specific - for
example, a poison pill or a stock option plan. But as to general, open-
ended proposals, contract failure is probable - for example, a broad-
brush abolition of director and officer fiduciary duties." Therefore,
126 Terms that permit private contract 'enable'; terms that supply prefabricated terms
that the parties would want anyway 'supplement.' Eisenberg, supra note 4, 1461.
127 See W. Bratton 'Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate
Fiduciary Law' (1993) 61 Geo. Wash. LR 1084, 1103-4.
128 See, e.g.,J. Gordon 'The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law' (1989) 89 Colum.
LR 1549, 1575-7; Eisenberg, supra note 4, 1477-80; Coffee 'No Exit?: Opting Out,
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies'
(1988) 53 Brooklyn LR919, 934.
129 Gordon, supra note 128, 1577-84. Coffee stresses this problem of 'agenda
manipulation' over the rational-apathy story. He points out that shareholders easily
can just say no, but that management's ability to manipulate the agenda tilts the
whole corporate contracting process. J. Coffee 'The Mandatory/Enabling Balance
in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role' (1989) 89 Colum. LR 1618,
1674-5, n234.
130 See Gordon, supra note 128, 1593-7; Coffee, supra note 129, 1664-5; Eisenberg,
supra note 4, 1469-70 (close corporations).
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according to the majority, charter amendments sometimes should be
subject to mandatory regulation.
Lucian Bebchuk happens to be a prominent member of the major-
ity, and has pointed out that those who support mandatory rules
cannot consistently advocate leaving mandatory subject matter to state
regulation. Since the states are free to offer different rules and corpora-
tions are free to choose among the states, the system fails or can be
made to fail as to the mandatory subject matter. Only a federal man-
date provides the requisite assurance.'31 Significantly, Romano agrees
on this point (p. 91). But she turns the point around and restates the
case for expanded opting out, apparently having noticed that few
members of the mandatory majority seem to be pushing the case for
federal intervention.
She does not share the majority's concern for midstream manage-
ment opportunism. Given a majority of institutional investors, she
figures that shareholder information costs respecting voting will be low.
Less restrictive alternatives like supermajority voting requirements can
ameliorate any problems.' Given the historical tendency towards the
mandate's erosion and an expectation that most firms would voluntar-
ily adopt some of what now is mandated, such as the duty of loyalty (p.
90), she suggests that we have little to fear in dispensing with it. So
little, in her view, that we should go a step further and make both the
131 Bebchuk, supra note 12, 1496-9.
132 Here she joins F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel 'The Corporate Contract' (1989) 89
Colum. LR 1416, 1444. Romano also argues that information costs need not be a
problem because a rationally uninformed shareholder cognizant of a problem of
management opportunism could always vote no or adopt some other arbitrary
voting practice (p. 88). The counterarguments here are, first, that the old Wall
Street rule stemmed in part from a collective view that holding a stock meant
support for the management group on governance matters, and, second, that the
absence of a mandatory voting confidentiality precludes such a strategy for many
institutions. This does not go to say that Romano's suggestion will not affect future
voting practices. See J. Grundfest 'Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing
with Barbarians Inside the Gates' (1993) 45 Stan. LR857.
Finally, Romano argues that if mid-stream opportunism were a systemic problem
for investors, we would expect to see ameliorative charter provisions, such as
appraisal rights in corporate charters, because promoters would have an incentive
to include them (p. 89). The counterargument here is that this point entails an
ahistorical jump over to economic theory that ignores corporate contracting
practice. Charters have historically been spare documents in part because investors
assumed that the state mandate took care of the opportunism problem.
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federal securities laws' mandatory disclosure system' and their insider
trading rules'" optional as well (pp. 91-108).
We learn something about Romano's unspoken assumptions if we
compare her views on federal intervention with her advocacy of univer-
sal opting out. She is risk averse in her projections on the former:
Interest group machinations make the federal legislative process
unreliable; therefore, the downsides loom large. Her allocation of an
empirical burden of proof in effect requires that the outcome of any
federal process be known in advance, a practical impossibility. More-
over, she does not discuss the possibility that some forms of federal
intervention might entail less intrusion and thus less risk of impairment
133 Most commentators today make reference to a public goods justification of the
mandatory disclosure system advanced by Easterbrook and Fischel. Easterbrook and
Fischel identify a number of situations in which companies, concerned about
incidental benefits to third parties, will have incentives to underdisclose. Easter-
brook and Fischel, supra note 4, 290-1. Romano is sceptical about this, and notes
that a supporting empirical case has not been made (pp. 92-3). More generally,
Romano notes that event studies of stock prices at the time of the enactment of the
securities laws and the time of certain major amendments do not show that returns
to investors increased. This, she says, undermines public goods justifications of the
system and gives rise to a question whether the costs outweigh the benefits (pp.
93-101).
I agree that the mandatory disclosure system gives rise to an active cost-benefit
question. But I think that simplification and flexibility respecting requirements
imposed on foreign issuers would provide a better focus for a reform program than
an opting-out privilege. The empirical studies show that the securities laws have
caused reductions in market variance (pp. 94-5). This implies that the mandate's
benefits come in the form of enhanced confidence in the system as a whole. Under
this rationale, attention shifts from transactions between individuals to the indi-
vidual's relationship to the system as a whole, and the element of trust incident to
the empowerment of corporate managers. The legal mandate backstops the regime
of empowerment. See N. Luhmann 'Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and
Alternatives' in D. Gambetta (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations
(New York: Blackwell 1988) 97; B. Barber The Logic and the Limits of Trust (New
Brunswick: Rutgers Press 1983) 9, 15, 19-20. The identification of a trust element
supports allocation of the empirical burden to the advocate of deregulation.
134 Romano applies the contractarian analysis of insider trading in advocating opting
out by individual firms, and rests on the proposition that empirical confirmation of
benefit to shareholders is thin (pp. 101-6). I agree, but would make reference to
outside political instructions in justifying the ban and its criminalization. See W.
Bratton 'Public Values, Private Business, and US Corporate Fiduciary Law' in J.
McCahery, S. Picciotto, and C. Scott (eds) Corporate Control and Accountability:
Changing Structures and the Dynamics of Regulation (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993)
23-40, which argues that fiduciary rules that do not enhance shareholder value can
be justified by a social consensus favouring control of management conduct.
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of well-functioning state law provisions than others. She proceeds on
the assumption that the only regulatory proposition on the table is
some form of federal chartering including fiduciary standards, a form
of intervention that does indeed invite practical questions about
feasibility and perverse effects. When her attention turns to deregula-
tion, her projections become risk prone. We are encouraged to with-
draw the mandates across the board, even though we have experienced
nothing resembling conventional contracting between shareholders
and managers in the past, and the federal disclosure system, although
costly, works reasonably well. The careful, practical inquiry that accom-
panies her discussion of federal intervention in state law now is absent,
even though the same questions can be asked about management
manipulation of the facilitating legislative process.
In sum, in Romano's normative vision the burden of proof lies in-
trinsically against regulation, new or old. She envisages a deregulatory
shock therapy that thrusts the corporation towards the contractual
ideal described in economic theory. The operative assumption must be
that investors, having substantial financial stakes, will intervene to
assure the subsequent evolution of effective contracting practices -
even though such practices have not existed in the past. This is not an
implausible projection. But it entails risks and remains controversial.
3. Responsive regulatory alternatives
Romano's absolute opposition to federal intervention may not make
complete sense even in the light of her normative vision. Her projected
expansion of the opting-out privilege anticipates a world in which
shareholder choices determine governance terms. Yet such a regime
seems an unlikely outcome under the state system as now constituted.
Consider the duty of loyalty as a case for an opting-out privilege.
Romano projects, reasonably, that most groups of shareholders would
choose to opt in even if the mandate were removed. But, even if most
shareholders would so choose, it is questionable whether we can expect
the choice to be offered by the state law regime. Under the postwar
model of fiduciary mandate, judicial fairness scrutiny obtained in
respect of every self-dealing transaction regardless of whether a major-
ity of disinterested directors approved the transaction. That model of
fiduciary scrutiny is disappearing. Under the revised Model Business
Corporation Act,'35 and repeated dicta of the Delaware Supreme
135 Model Business Corporation Act, sections 8.61, 8.62.
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Court," the competing states are substituting a regime in which
disinterested director approval results in business judgment scrutiny. If
the new rules mean what they say,137 managers, and hence competing
states, have little incentive to offer the shareholders a choice that holds
out the possibility of a return to the old regime of fairness scrutiny.
Faced with the prospect of a mandate with no bite or a shareholder
option to contract into a strict rule, managers probably would prefer
the former. More generally, as Romano points out in respect of anti-
takeover statutes, the states tend to open doors to shareholder choice
on an opting-out basis rather than an opting-in basis. That is, a newly
enacted default rule applies subject to an ex post election to opt out;
the states almost never condition the application of legislative innova-
tions responsive to management preferences on ex ante shareholder
approval. This makes shareholder choice hard to exercise, given the
shareholders' collective-action problem and the managers' agenda
control.
On this point Romano suggests that, in lieu of the negative price
effects of anti-takeover legislation, the statutory defaults should be
changed from opting-out to opting-in provisions, which would put the
decision in the hands of those who bear the financial consequences.
This approach is politically feasible at the state level, she asserts,
because it frames the issue in terms of shareholder voting, and fran-
chise extensions are hard to oppose. Moreover, management lobbying
against such provisions would not carry much weight - since the lobby-
ing managers would be seeking to strip shareholders of the vote, they
would be asking the legislature to 'invert the agency relation' (pp.
83-4).
Romano's suggestion of an 'opting-in' approach is an excellent one.
It invites expansive application to any new legislation that impairs
existing shareholder rights." But her projection of state-level political
feasibility does not resonate similarly. State legislatures do not appear
to have been overly concerned with inversions of the management-
shareholder agency relationship in recent years.'39 The system's struc-
136 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634A.2d 345, 366 n34 (Del. 1993); Marcianov. Nakash
535 A.2d 400, 403-5 (Del. 1987).
137 They may not. An imaginative judge with a sense that a transaction is unfair can
find ways to attack the process employed by the approving board.
138 Black, supra note 14, 582.
139 In fact, any such concern would be surprising for doctrinal reasons. Simply,
American corporate law does not directly place shareholders and managers in a
principal-agent framework. Under the doctrine, the managers are agents of the
CORPORATE LAW'S RACE TO NOWHERE IN PARTICULAR 439
tural bias towards management makes a political turnabout unlikely.
Federal imposition of such a principle at the urging of the newly vocal
institutional shareholders seems the more feasible scenario, albeit one
unlikely of near-term realization. 4 °
Romano dismisses this idea with the comment that the 'optional
feature of state takeover statutes is not a characteristic of the national
regime' (p. 84). But, true though the point may be, it does not con-
clude the discussion of relative feasibility. For all the talk about the
inherently enabling character of state law, opting-out provisions
attached to new rules importing substantial normative changes are
recent innovations. Opting-in provisions that hold out the possibility of
active shareholder participation in the selection of contract terms are
almost unheard-of at any level. Nothing prevents the federal govern-
ment from taking the leading role in filling in this blank slate. Indeed,
the opting-in suggestion has roots in an SEC report circulated in 1983. "'
The long list of proposed but unenacted federal corporate law provi-
sions mentioned the problem of shareholder access as early as 1943.142
More broadly, agenda control remains a critical component of man-
agement's governance edge over shareholders and a barrier to the
realization of the contractual regime Romano envisages. It is enabled
by the enabling state regime. It will take a substantial process reform to
wrest away management's control. At a minimum, shareholders need
corporation in the first instance. Responsibility to the corporation overlaps with
shareholder value maximization in most, but not all, circumstances, giving rise to
the appearance of an agency. But 'entity' concerns often interpose themselves to
the detriment of shareholders, as occurs throughout the law of takeover defence.
The strict agency relationship exists only in economic theory. State charter
competition has done little over the last century to bring the law closer into line
with the economic model. See Bratton, supra note 34.
140 Black makes this suggestion. In his view, federal rules could require that a majority
of independent shareholders of public companies be required to elect to be
governed by changes in state law that affect the division of power between
management and shareholders. He would permit new publicly offered firms of
sufficient size to insure institutional interest to opt out of such 'change governing
rules,' but would not extend the privilege to existing public companies. Black,
supra note 14, 582.
141 SEC Advisory Committee Report on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations,
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Special Report No. 1028, pp. 37-40 (15 July 1983)
(recommending annual shareholder advisory votes on, among other things,
supermajority and disenfranchising charter provisions).
142 SEC Proxy Rules, Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on HR 1493, HR 1821 and HR 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. pp. 17-9,
34-43 (1943) (proposal to circulate shareholder nominations in proxy statements).
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an avenue that facilitates choices on internal rules on voting, fiduciary
duty, corporate-control transactions, and state of incorporation. The
feasibility of contractual governance can be tested only once that
avenue of access to the agenda has been constructed. Federal interven-
tion is the most expeditious means to that end, and shareholder acti-
vists are well advised to direct their attention to it. Romano, in staking
out the middle ground and identifying the virtues of the state system,
has effectively laid the conceptual groundwork for such limited federal
intervention directed to the end of expanded shareholder choice.
C. CONCLUSION
The product competition model, used as a normative template, is
supposed to keep the field clear of legal artifices that retard the
evolution of efficient rules selected by actors with investments at stake.
But it is not at all clear that the American institution of corporate
charter competition has itself evolved so as to leave a clear field.
Movement towards the contractual ideal of corporate law may yet
depend on central government intervention. Such intervention need
not destroy the benefits of charter competition. Academic discussion
can safely go forward on the topic of responsive regulatory strategies.
As it does so, discussants on all sides will rely heavily on the work of
Roberta Romano. And, despite normative differences, all should agree
that her work makes one of the handful of formative contributions to
American corporate law of recent decades. One can only look forward
to her future interventions.
